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I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant/PlaintiffSt. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center (St. Luke's) had no 
attorney-client relationship with Respondent/Defendant Thomas R. Luciani and Stamper, 
Rubens, Stocker & Smith, P.S. (collectively Luciani). Luciani did defend a Twin Falls County-
owned hospital, Magic Valley Regional Medical Center (the Hospital), in litigation alleging 
wrongful termination and a violation of the False Claims Act related to fraudulent Medicare 
billing (the Suter Litigation). Luciani was replaced by other counsel and his representation ofthe 
County-owned Hospital ended on March 14, 2006, when the substitution of counsel was filed. 
Twin Falls County thereafter sold the Hospital to St. Luke's pursuant to a Sale and Lease 
Agreement. S1. Luke's, as part of the consideration for the purchase of certain Twin Falls 
County assets, assumed liability for the Suter Litigation. St. Luke's settled the Suter Litigation 
four years after Luciani was replaced as counsel. 
In January 2008, S1. Luke's brought this legal malpractice action against Luciani in the 
United States District Court for the District of Idaho. S1. Luke's contends it can proceed against 
Luciani for legal malpractice based on the terms of the Sale and Lease Agreement executed on 
March 16, 2006 between Twin Falls County and St. Luke's and closed on July 1,2006. While 
S1. Luke's has been described as Luciani's former client's successor, more accurately this case 
involves a business asset purchaser seeking to pursue a legal malpractice claim against one of the 
seller's attorneys. The Sale and Lease Agreement contains no specific assignment of a legal 
malpractice claim against Luciani. (Order Certifying Question to Idaho Supreme Court 
(D. Idaho Oct. 27, 2011) (Order), pp. 2-3). In fact, it contains no reference to legal malpractice 
at all. St. Luke's assignment argument fails for three reasons: (1) Idaho, like the vast majority 
of states, does not permit assignment of legal malpractice claims; (2) even if assignment was 
permitted under Idaho law, no effective assignment was made under Idaho law; and (3) Twin 
Falls had no legal malpractice claim to assign. 
Luciani sought summary judgment. On October 28,2011, the United States District 
Court (the Honorable Edward J. Lodge) issued an order certifying to this Court the following 
question: "Does Idaho law allow legal malpractice claims to be assigned," recognizing the 
answer may be dispositive of this case. (Order, pp. 1, 6). Luciani respectfully requests this 
Court answer the certified question in the negative. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Twin Falls County Was Luciani's Client. 
Until July 1, 2006, Magic Valley Regional Medical Center (the Hospital) was a Twin 
Falls County-owned facility. I (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 7; Tompkins Supp. Dec. Ex. C). Twin Falls 
County, the Hospital's owner during the time period of Luciani's representation of the Hospital, 
was Luciani's client. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 4 and Ex. 7). 
I The record in this case consists primarily of the exhibits attached to the Declaration of 
Christopher W. Tompkins in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Tompkins 
Dec.); Declaration of Gregory D. Call in support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment (Call Dec.); Declaration of Ann S. Taylor Pitts in Support of Plaintiff's 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Pitts Dec.); Declaration of Dennis 
Barry in Support of Plaintiff' s Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Barry 
Dec.) and Supplemental Declaration of Christopher W. Tompkins in Support of Defendants' 
Reply to Motion for Summary Judgment (Tompkins Supp. Dec). The record cites will be to the 
Declaration and the exhibit numbers. 
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B. St. Luke's Did Not, Pursuant to the Sale and Lease Agreement, Succeed to 
the Ownership of Luciani's Client, Which Was Twin Falls County. 
In its appellate brief, St. Luke's states "[i]n July 2006 Magic Valley sold substantially all 
of its assets and liabilities to St. Luke's." (Appellant's Brief, p. 1). This is factually inaccurate. 
It was Twin Falls County as owner that sold to St. Luke's Health System Ltd., St. Luke's 
Regional Medical Center Ltd. and St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center Ltd. 
(collectively referred to as "St. Luke's"), as buyer, certain County-owned assets as set out in the 
parties' March 16,2006 "Sale and Lease Agreement for the Creation ofa New Health System" 
(hereinafter "Agreement"). (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 7). St. Luke's was a new entity, created to own 
and operate the Hospital after the asset purchase from Twin Falls County.2 (!d.) 
The Hospital did not merely "change its name." Before the asset purchase, Twin Falls 
County owned the Hospital; Magic Valley was the name for the county operation. (Id.) Twin 
Falls County sold andlor leased assets to St. Luke's, which operates as an entirely different 
entity. So while St. Luke's took over ownership of certain buildings and the Hospital's business, 
it did not succeed to the ownership of Luciani's client, Twin Falls County. Although Twin Falls 
County no longer owns the Hospital, Twin Falls County still exists. 
Article II of the Agreement identifies the Twin Falls County assets to be leased, sold, 
assigned and transferred to St. Luke's. (Id.) Twin Falls County agreed to assign to St. Luke's 
"[a]ll of the Hospital's contracts, agreements and leases (collectively, the "Assigned Agree-
ments"), and all of the benefits and burdens of such Assigned Agreements, to the extent such 
2 St. Luke's has since built and moved to a new facility in Twin Falls County. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6, n.2). 
3 
Assigned Agreements are assignable." (Id. at Agreement 2.2(b )). Under Section 2.5, entitled 
"Other Property," and except for certain specified excluded assets, the parties agreed that it was 
their intent "that all property and interests of the Hospital, whether real or personal, tangible or 
intangible, be leased, sold, assigned, licensed or transferred" by Twin Falls County. (!d. at 
Agreement Section 2.5). 
The Agreement contains no explicit reference to legal malpractice claims or to the 
assignment of such claims. The Agreement does not state that a legal malpractice claim was 
included in the Agreement, or even that such a claim was contemplated at the time ofthe 
Agreement. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 7). 
C. St. Luke's Chose to Assume Liability for the Pending Suter Litigation 
Instead of Paying More in Cash for the County's Assets. 
St. Luke's exposure in the Suter Litigation occurred only because it chose to assume that 
liability as currency for its purchase and lease of Twin Falls County assets, instead ofleaving 
that liability with Twin Falls County and paying more in cash for these assets. (Id. at Agreement 
Art. III). "As part of the consideration for the Hospital Assets," St. Luke's agreed to "assume all 
debts, liabilities and obligations" of the Hospital as of the closing date. (!d.) Excluded were 
certain liabilities that are "subject to the Idaho Tort Claims Act and are covered and paid by 
insurance." (Id.) 
One of the liabilities assumed by St. Luke's was the Suter Litigation, disclosed in 
Schedule 17.6 and page 5 ofthe Updated Due Diligence Questionnaire and Document Request 
attached to the Agreement. (Tompkins SUpp. Dec. Ex. C & D). St. Luke's knew, when it chose 
4 
to assume liability for the Suter Litigation, that the Suter plaintiffs sought damages in excess of 
$18 million. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 26). st. Luke's also knew that the Hospital's insurer was 
refusing to pay for Luciani's replacement counsel- the law firm of McDermott, Will & Emory, 
LLP (McDermott). (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 56). 
The Agreement permits St. Luke's to seek indemnity from Twin Falls County if the 
assumed liabilities proved to be materially greater than represented. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 7 Art. 
XV, Section 15.1(b)). No such indemnity has been sought. 
The transactions contemplated by the Agreement closed on July 1,2006. (Tompkins 
Dec. Ex. 7 Art. XIII Sec. 13.2(a); Ex. 74 & 75). Several operative documents were signed at 
closing to effectuate the transfers promised in the Agreements. (Id.; Tompkins Dec. Ex. 76). 
The Bill of Sale transferred certain assets from Twin Falls County to St. Luke's. (Tompkins 
Dec. Ex. 74). A Quitclaim Deed transferred certain real property to St. Luke's. (Tompkins Dec. 
Ex. 75). None of the documents signed refer to or purport to transfer any legal malpractice 
claim. (Id.) 
Twin Falls County and St. Luke's, both sophisticated parties, knew how to effect an 
explicit assignment and transfer of rights. These entities executed an Assignment and 
Assumption Agreement (Assignment) among Twin Falls County, St. Luke's and McDermott 
dated June 30, 2006, which contains a specific and explicit assignment and assumption of rights 
and responsibilities relating to McDermott. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 76). Under this Agreement, 
St. Luke's became obligated to McDermott under its retainer agreement with the Hospital, 
effective July 1, 2006. (Id.) 
5 
D. Three Suter Lawsuits Were Pending Against the Hospital When St. Luke's 
Assumed Liability. 
At the time of the Agreement, the Hospital had three lawsuits pending against it, all 
initiated by Cherri Suter and Mindy Harmer (Suter Plaintiffs). In August 2001, the Suter 
Plaintiffs filed suit in Idaho State Court against the Hospital alleging retaliatory discharge and 
various causes of action in connection with alleged breaches of their employment contracts. 
(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 9). This suit is entitled Cornerstone Therapy LLC, Cheri Suter and Randy 
Suter, individually and as wife and husband, Mindy Harmer and Eric Herzog, individually and 
as wife and husband v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, a political subdivision of Twin 
Falls County and John Does I-X. (ld.) 
The Hospital employed local counsel Kent Taylor (Taylor) and his daughter, Ann Taylor 
Pitts (Pitts), who acted essentially as the Hospital's general counsel. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 11; 
Stanger Depo. p. 60). The Hospital was initially defended in the state court Suter Litigation by 
Kim Stanger and the firm of Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley. (ld. at Stanger Depo. p. 58). 
Stanger began his representation of the Hospital in July 2001. (Id., p. 59). Mr. Stanger's 
representation of the Hospital was paid for by Twin Falls County's insurer, Truck Insurance 
Exchange (Truck). (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 2; Taylor Depo. pp. 16-18). 
At a 2002 mediation of the Suter Plaintiffs' state court wrongful termination claims, the 
Suter Plaintiffs indicated their intent to file a False Claims Act action against the Hospital for 
fraudulent Medicare billing practices. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 11; Stanger Depo., pp. 58, 59, 81, 
121). In January of 2003, the Suter Plaintiffs did file that action in the United States District 
6 
Court for the District of Idaho. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 12). The action alleged the Hospital 
violated provisions of the Federal False Claims Act by submitting fraudulent claims for 
reimbursement to Medicare for rehabilitation services provided in the Transitional Care Unit 
(TCU) from July 1998 through October 2000. The Suter Plaintiffs brought the suit as a Qui Tam 
action, in the name of the United States government (hereinafter referred to as the "False Claims 
Act Litigation" or the "Qui Tam action"). (Id.) 
In March of 2003, the Suter Plaintiffs filed a third Complaint/second Federal Court 
Complaint in Idaho Federal Court, entitled Cherri Suter, Randy Suter, Mindy Harmer, Eric 
Herzog and Cornerstone Therapy, LLC v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center. (Tompkins 
Dec. Ex. 13). The Complaint included various causes of action for wrongful termination and 
breach of an employment contract. The Idaho state employment action was stayed pending 
resolution of the federal employment action. The federal employment action was subsequently 
consolidated with the Suter Plaintiffs' Qui Tam action. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 65, pp. 6-7). 
E. Luciani Defended the Hospital in the Suter Litigation Beginning in July 
2003. 
In July of2003, John Kee, the Hospital's CEO, removed Stanger as counsel for the 
Hospital in the Suter Litigation because he "did not get a real strong feeling that [Stanger] 
believed in our case and was an advocate for the hospital." (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 14; Kee Depo. 
pp. 110-111). Kee handled all communications with Stanger through the Hospital's counsel, 
Taylor and Pitts. (Id., p. 113). Kee asked Pitts to find someone "that could appropriately 
represent us and provide the defense that we were required to have." (Id. pp. 158-159). 
7 
Taylor, at Kee's request, took over management of the file from the Hospital's risk 
manager. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 16; Fisher Depo. p. 119). Kee's comment to the Hospital's risk 
manager was Stanger "didn't know what he was doing." (Id., p. 120). 
In July 2003, Luciani and his law firm were retained by the Hospital, through its insurer, 
to replace Stanger. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 2; Taylor Depo. pp. 16-17; Ex. 14; Kee Depo. pp. 116-
117). Luciani is a litigation lawyer who primarily practices in eastern Washington and northern 
Idaho. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 17; Luciani Depo. p. 15). Luciani gathered facts and evidence. He 
participated in depositions and interviews. He conducted research and prepared the case for trial. 
(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 18). 
Luciani interviewed the Hospital executives, investigated allegations related to the Suter 
Litigation by speaking with numerous current and former employees of the Hospital and 
employees of co-defendant National Rehabilitation Partners (NRP), worked with Hospital 
executives and employees to respond to discovery, and defended Hospital employees, executives 
and former employees' depositions. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 18, 19,20,21,22,23,24,25). 
Whenever depositions or other events occurred, Luciani met with Hospital executives 
and/or Taylor/Pitts to discuss what occurred and its significance. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 17; 
Luciani Depo. pp. 150-51). His billing records reflect that he met with or participated in 
telephone calls with Hospital executives and with the Hospital's general counsel Taylor/Pitts on 
at least 39 occasions. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 18). 
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F. Luciani's Representation of the Hospital Ended Before the Execution of the 
Twin Falls County/St. Luke's Agreement. 
The Suter Litigation expert disclosure deadline required the Suter Plaintiffs' expert 
reports be produced by December 16,2005. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 27). The Hospital's expert 
reports were to be produced by February 3,2006. (ld.) On or about December 22,2005, the 
Suter Plaintiffs submitted a report from their liability expert, R. Lawrence Nicholson, who had 
performed a "probe audit sample of all patient files for selected days of therapy within the period 
of July 1, 1998 to October 1, 2000." (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 26). Based on this probe sample, 
Nicholson concluded that all of the Hospital's TCU Medicare billings were improper, and he 
calculated the resulting False Claims Act damages to be over $18 million. (Id.) 
Luciani advised Taylor of the contents of the Nicholson report by telephone on January 3, 
2006. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 18; Call Dec. Ex. 8; Luciani Depo. p. 40). He forwarded the 
Nicholson report to Taylor on January 6, 2006. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 28). The approach taken by 
the Suter Plaintiffs' expert dictated what the Hospital needed to do in response. (Tompkins Dec. 
Ex. 30; Barry Depo. p. 136; Call Dec. Ex. 14; Pitts Depo. pp. 115-116; Tompkins Dec. Ex. 83, 
p.7). 
Taylor and Kee viewed the Hospital as facing an emergency. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 2; 
Taylor Depo. p. 91; Dec. Ex. 30; Barry Depo. pp. 136-138; Kee Dec. Ex. 14; Kee Depo. pp. 158-
159). No damages expert had been retained yet by the Hospital. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 17; 
Luciani Depo. pp. 45-46). John Groesbeck, the Hospital's CFO, recalled the Hospital's concern 
was that "the case was not moving towards settlement." (Call Dec. Ex. 21; Groesbeck Depo. 
9 
p. 96). Kee demanded that Taylor and Pitts find new counsel to represent the Hospital. 
(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 14; Kee Depo., pp. 158-159). 
Pitts, who had little or no litigation experience, no experience in managing a team of 
lawyers, and no experience in addressing Medicare fraud litigation, looked for new counsel. 
(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 34; Pitts Depo. pp. 20-22). By January 16, 2006, Pitts had contacted the law 
firm of McDermott, Will & Emory, LLP (McDermott) to represent the Hospital. (Tompkins 
Dec. Ex. 31). 
In the words of a McDermott senior partner David Rosenbloom, the Hospital "freaked 
out" after receiving the Nicholson report. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 29; Call Dec. Ex. 14; Pitts Depo. 
pp.68-69). Rosenbloom dismissed Nicholson's report on January 16,2006 as "obviously a crap 
damages analysis, since it is based on a 25 case probe sample!" (Jd.) On January 18,2006, 
Rosenbloom noted to Russell Hayman, a McDermott attorney who would head the Hospital's 
defense of the Qui Tam claims with Rosenbloom, that McDermott "[c]an shoot holes in [the] 
reports." (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 40; Hayman Depo. p. 5; Ex. 41). By January 18,2006, 
McDermott had agreed to represent the Hospital with regard to the False Claims Act assertions if 
a potential conflict could be resolved. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 32). 
Simultaneously, on January 18, 2006, Pitts learned Luciani had obtained a 30-day 
extension - until March 6,2006 - to serve the Hospital's expert report. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 35). 
Based on the advice of McDermott, Pitts contacted Georgeann Edford of Coding Compliance 
Solutions (Edford) to respond to the Nicholson expert report. Ms. Edford advised she was used 
to working on short time frames and could accommodate the schedule for filing an expert report. 
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(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 36 & 37). A Retention Agreement between McDermott and the Hospital 
was executed on January 30, 2006 for McDermott to defend the Hospital against the False 
Claims Act allegations. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 33). 
By March 5, 2006, Edford had completed an audit of the Hospital's TCU files, and had 
reported her findings to McDermott. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 40; Hayman Depo. pp. 36, 109, 117, 
118 and 119). Based on Hayman's conference with Edford, he and Rosenblum reported to the 
Hospital that Edford found "no net over reimbursement," directly contradicting the Suter 
Plaintiffs allegations. (ld. at 117-119). 
Mediation was conducted on March 6 and 7, 2006. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 42). The Suter 
Plaintiffs made an initial demand for $16.5 million. (Id.) The Hospital did not respond with a 
counter-offer. (Id.) Representing the Hospital at that mediation were McDermott attorneys 
Rosenbloom and Hayman as well as its general counsel Taylor and Pitts. (ld.) Luciani attended, 
but he played no substantive role. (!d.) Luciani later reported to the Hospital's insurer that the 
mediator suggested the matter could have settled for $4 million. (Id.) 
Pitts explains the Hospital offered nothing at mediation based on its reliance on 
Ms. Edford's audit. (Call Dec. Ex. 14; Pitts Depo. pp. 38-39). The Hospital, according to 
Ms. Pitts, had no liability on any of the Suter claims. (!d.) 
By March 10,2006, the Hospital had retained Patricia Olsson of Moffatt, Thomas, 
Barrett, Rock & Fields (Moffatt Thomas), a Boise law firm, to replace Luciani to act as primary 
counsel on the wrongful termination claims and as local counsel for McDermott on the Qui Tam 
litigation. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 47 & 48). A substitution of counsel was filed on March 14, 
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2006, removing Luciani as counsel of record and establishing Olsson and McDermott as the 
Hospital's counsel of record. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 4). Olsson was local counsel on the Qui Tam 
portion of the case being handled by McDermott, and Olsson defended the Hospital on the 
wrongful termination part of the Suter Litigation. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 57). 
Two days after the substitution of counsel was filed, on March 16, 2006, Twin Falls 
County entered into its previously described Agreement with St. Luke's. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 7). 
G. The Hospital Did Not Advise Its Insurer of the Retention of McDermott Until 
Mid-March 2006 and Truck Offered a Defense to St. Luke's Through Idaho 
Counsel. 
As noted by Pitts in a March 17, 2006 email to the Hospital's CEO Kee: "All fires have 
been extinguished and the case is moving in a more favorable direction." (Tompkins Dec. 
Ex. 46). By the time Luciani was removed as counsel, the alleged "emergency" was addressed, 
and an audit had been conducted. The date for expert disclosures had again been extended until 
March 24,2006. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 43). A responsive expert report was timely served. 
(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 44, 45). 
The Hospital did not advise Truck, its insurer, of its retention of McDermott, or its 
dissatisfaction with Luciani, until mid-March 2006. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 55). Truck declined to 
pay McDermott's fees and costs on the ground the Hospital incurred the expense for McDermott 
voluntarily. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 56). Truck continued to defend St. Luke's through Olsson. 
(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 6, pp. 12-13). 
During an exchange of communications between St. Luke's and Truck during the 
summer of2006, Truck, on July 31,2006, offered to provide a full defense to St. Luke's in the 
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Qui Tam case through Idaho counsel other than McDermott. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 57, 59 & 60). 
St. Luke's did not respond to Truck's offer. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 61). 
H. McDermott Billed Nearly $12 Million for Fees and Costs Over a Four-Year 
Period. 
After being substituted as counsel, McDermott defended against the Suter Plaintiffs' Qui 
Tam claims for more than four years, incurring nearly $12 million in attorney's fees and costs. 
(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 8 p. 7; Ex. 32,33 & 49). St. Luke's provided no formal billing guidelines to 
McDermott. Pitts, who had limited experience reviewing billing entries, relied on McDermott's 
assurances its billings were justified. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 34; Pitts Depo. pp. 22 & 23). Pitts 
viewed McDermott's fees as justified because Qui Tam cases against a hospital are expensive to 
litigate. (Call Dec. Ex. 14 Pitts Depo. pp. 109-11). 
While Pitts complains that Luciani did not file a motion to dismiss when he was counsel, 
she admits she does not know if such a motion would have been granted. (Id., pp. 183-185). She 
deferred to Hayman any after-the-fact assessment on such issues. (ld.) Moreover, Pitts could 
not calculate how costs would have changed if Luciani had represented the Hospital differently. 
(ld., p. 121). 
McDermott had submitted an initial budget in which it estimated initial defense efforts 
would cost between $450,000 and $750,000. The completion of additional discovery, expert 
consultations, non-dispositive motions and preparing for summary judgment was estimated to 
require an additional expense of$500,000 to $750,000. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 33). 
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Hayman, S1. Luke's lead attorney in the Suter Litigation, testified that the original 
McDennott budget for the Suter Litigation was an estimate. He stated the fees increased because 
the course of the litigation changed "because of Nicholson's withdrawal, because of strategic and 
tactical decisions that the [Suter Plaintiffs] made with respect to that withdrawal, because of 
orders that the Court made with respect to the Nicholson withdrawal .... ,,3 (Tompkins Dec. 
Ex. 40; Hayman Depo., pp. 31-32). Hayman acknowledged this "litigation, as with every 
litigation, it takes on its own life ... in tenns of the work undertaken." (!d., p. 32). 
S1. Luke's and the Suter Plaintiffs litigated a sanctions motion related to the replacement 
of Nicholson. S1. Luke's was awarded approximately $850,000 of approximately $1.5 million 
sought as sanctions. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 50). S1. Luke's also pursued motions for summary 
judgment and Daubert motions. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 52 & 53). 
I. St. Luke's Settled Its Dispute With Truck and Settled the Suter Lawsuit for 
$4.25 Million. 
In November 2006, Truck filed a declaratory action asserting it had no duty to pay 
McDennott's attorney's fees. S1. Luke's counterclaimed, seeking its defense fees, costs and 
extra-contractual damages. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 62,63 & 64). Truck and S1. Luke's settled their 
dispute on November 25,2009. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 73). Truck paid S1. Luke's $3.5 million in 
exchange for S1. Luke's agreement to release Truck from all claims, including any obligation to 
3 The Suter Plaintiffs withdrew Nicholson as an expert because of discrepancies in his 
CV. They substituted Ronald Clark, who opined that the False Claim Act liability was at least 
$17.47 million. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 50 & 51). 
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pay fees or costs incurred by McDennott in the Suter Plaintiffs' litigation, including fees or costs 
incurred by Edford or her company, Coding Compliance Solutions. (Jd.) 
On April 6, 2010, St. Luke's agreed to settle the Suter Plaintiffs' litigation for $4.25 
million. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 49; 54). 
J. After Settling, St. Luke's Seeks to Recover Millions From Luciani for His 
Representation of Twin Falls County Prior to March 14, 2006. 
St. Luke's has brought this legal malpractice action against Luciani for his representation 
of the Hospital prior to March 14,2006. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 1). It seeks to recover by this 
lawsuit the $4.25 million it paid in settlement ofthe Suter Plaintiffs' litigation; $12 million in 
attomey's fees it paid to McDennott (less amounts recovered from insurers and sanctions from 
Suter Plaintiffs); and $2.7 million in fees paid to St. Luke's present counsel incurred in pursuit of 
insurance proceeds and interest. (Tompkins Dec. Ex. 8). It is also seeking to add a claim for 
punitive damages. (Order, p. 4). 
ARGUMENT 
ST. LUKE'S SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED ON A CLAIM 
OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST LUCIANI, WHO WAS NOT 
ST. LUKE'S LAWYER. 
A. This Court's Review Is De Novo. 
Luciani agrees with St. Luke's that the issue certified to this Court presents an issue of 
law. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,90 P.3d 884, 886 (2004). Luciani, however, asserts 
that this Court should hold St. Luke's cannot proceed with its claim oflegal malpractice under 
Idaho law. 
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B. There Was No Relationship Between Luciani and St. Luke's, But St. Luke's 
Asserts It Can Proceed by Assignment. 
In Idaho, "[a]s a general rule, an attorney will be held liable for negligence only to his or 
her client and not to someone with whom the attorney does not have an attorney-client 
relationship." !d., 140 Idaho at 134, 90 P .3d at 887. Except in very narrow circumstances, this 
Court has required a direct attorney-client relationship to exist between the plaintiff and the 
attorney-defendant in a legal malpractice action. Id.; Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 845, 
243 P.3d 642,661 (Idaho 2010) ("Harrigfeld is the only case in which this Court has found an 
exception" to the requirement that there be an attorney-client relationship in order to sue an 
attorney for legal malpractice). 
St. Luke's was never Luciani's client. There is no direct relationship between St. Luke's 
and Luciani, and there is no relationship between St. Luke's and Luciani which falls within the 
Court's recognized narrow-excepted circumstances. Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 138,90 P.3d at 
889. St. Luke's seeks to proceed by assignment of such a claim from Twin Falls County. Under 
Idaho law, "[a]n assignment of the chose in action transfers to the assignee and divests the 
assignor of all control and right to the cause of action, and the assignee becomes the real party in 
interest." Purco Fleet Services, Inc. v. !daho State Dept. of Finance, 140 Idaho 121, 126, 90 
P.3d 346,351 (2004). 
An assignment of legal malpractice claim is a relatively recent phenomenon, with the 
seminal case of Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976), 
decided in 1976. The majority of the jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have held legal 
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malpractice claims are not assignable. Most courts have viewed the intimate nature of the 
relationship between an attorney and his client to be the compelling policy reason to prohibit 
such an assignment. Delaware ewe Liquidation Corp. v. Martin, 584 S.E.2d 473,477-78 (W. 
Va. 2003) (listing the cases across the country so holding). Luciani respectfully requests this 
Court also so hold. 
Where the propriety of an assignment of a legal malpractice cause of action has been 
raised, courts generally address three issues. First, do legal malpractice claims sound in contract 
or in tort? Historically, torts of a personal nature are not assignable. Second, however classified, 
do legal malpractice claims survive the death ofthe claimant? Assignability has been equated 
with survivability. If the claim abates at death, it is not assignable. Third, iflegal malpractice 
claims survive, are there countervailing public policy considerations that operate to invalidate the 
assignment of such claims? The majority ofthe courts have held such assignments are contrary 
to public policy. Addressing these factors, Luciani requests this Court hold any Twin Falls 
County legal malpractice claim against him is not assignable. 
C. St. Luke's Claim Against Luciani Is Based in Tort. 
This Court, in Bishop v. Owens, _ P.3d ----y 2012 WL 90134 (Idaho 2012), held that 
while "legal malpractice actions are an amalgam oftort and contract theories," the "contract 
basis of legal malpractice actions is the failure to perform obligations directly specified in the 
written contract." !d. at *3. Accordingly, "unless an attorney fool-heartedly contracts with his 
client guaranteeing a specific outcome in the litigation or provides for a higher standard of care 
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in the contract, he is held to the standard of care expected of an attorney. Breach of that duty is a 
tort." Id. (internal citations omitted). 
A claim for legal malpractice arises from the uniquely personal relationship between the 
attorney and client, where the attorney has breached a personal duty owed to his or her client and 
where the client has been injured as a result. Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 136-37,90 P.3d at 886-87. 
"The attorney's duty to his or her client must remain paramount." Id. at 140 Idaho at 138-39,90 
P.3d at 888-89. Here, any claim against Luciani arises out of tort, not contract. 
Because legal malpractice is a personal tort involving a confidential fiduciary relationship 
of the very highest character, with an undivided duty ofloyalty owed to the client, such claims 
are not assignable. Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 86 (finding tort); Roberts v. Holland & Hart, 857 
P.2d 492,495 (Colo. App. 1993), cert. denied ("the assignment oflegal malpractice claims 
involve matters of personal trust and personal services and do not lend themselves to 
assignability ... "); Wagener v. McDonald, 509 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) 
(allowing assignment oflegal malpractice claims "would be incompatible with the attorney's 
duty to act loyally towards the client ... and to maintain confidentiality"); George L. Blum, 
Assignability o/Claim/or Legal Malpractice, 64 A.L.R.6th 473 at § 9 (2011). 
In accord with Idaho law and the majority of jurisdictions to have addressed the issue of 
assignability, Luciani requests this Court hold such claims are not assignable in Idaho. 
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D. At the Time of the Purported Assignment, Legal Malpractice Claims Did Not 
Survive and, Therefore, Any Claimed Assignment is Unenforceable. 
This Court has endorsed the common law rule that equated assignability with 
survivability. MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249 P. 254, 257 (1926) ("The assignability of a 
cause of action is by the authorities intimately associated with, and in most cases held to depend 
on the same principle as the survival of a cause of action. "). At the time of the events at issue -
the Twin Falls County/St. Luke's Agreement and even at the time of filing of this legal 
malpractice action - Idaho did not have a general survival statute. The common law governed 
the abatement of any claim for professional negligence. Under Idaho's common law, those 
claims sounding in tort abate while claims arising out of contract generally survive the death of 
the claimants. Bishop, __ P.3d ___ 2012 WL 90134, citing Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 
667,34 P.2d 957,960-61 (1934); Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 477,477 (1919). 
As this Court held in Bishop, under Idaho's common law a legal malpractice claim, 
which sounds in tort, abates upon the client's death. _ P.3d _,2012 WL 90134. It does not 
survive. Accordingly, St. Luke's assertion and discussion at pages 24-26 of its Appellant's Brief 
claiming that under Idaho's common law, legal malpractice claims survive and are therefore 
assignable, is incorrect. Any legal malpractice claim against Luciani is not assignable. 
While the Idaho Legislature has amended Idaho Code Ann. § 5-327(2) to provide that 
negligence claims, in which this Court includes legal malpractice claims, no longer abate on 
death, this legislation is not retroactive. Bishop, 2012 WL 90134. As St. Luke's recognizes, this 
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statute did not go into effect until July 1,2011. (Appellant's Brief, p. 26, n.7). It does not apply 
to this action. 
To the extent this Court has equated assignability with survivability under the common 
law, any legal malpractice claim against Luciani is not assignable under Idaho law because such 
claims did not survive the death of a client prior to the amendment of Idaho Code Ann. 
§ 5-327(2). 
E. Even If a Legal Malpractice Claim Survives, It Is Not Assignable on Public 
Policy Grounds. 
Even though with the enactment of Idaho Code Ann. § 5-327(2) a legal malpractice claim 
now survives, there is no indication the Idaho Legislature intended a concomitant expansion of 
the class of causes of action that are assignable. "Although a chose in action must survive to be 
assignable, not every action that survives is assignable." Can Do, Inc. Pension and Profit 
Sharing Plan and Successor Plans v. Manier, Herod, Hollabaugh & Smith, 922 S.W.2d 865,867 
(Tenn. 1996). Where there is legislation on survivability, survivability and assignability in most 
jurisdictions have now been disconnected for purposes of determining the assignability of a legal 
malpractice claim. Joos v. Drillock, 338 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that 
Michigan's survival statute states "[a]U actions and claims survive death[,]" but adopting the rule 
that "survivability is not the only test" and concluding that legal malpractice claims were 
unassignable based on public policy grounds); TMJ Hawaii, Inc. v. Nippon Trust Bank, 153 P.3d 
444, 455 n.4 (Haw. 2007) (listing cases across the country where the courts have held 
20 
survivability a non- factor in the assignability analysis and explicitly abandoning reference to 
survivability when analyzing assignability ofa claim for relief). 
The basis for finding a survivable cause of action non-assignable is public policy. Most 
jurisdictions prohibit assignments of legal malpractice claims under any circumstances. Blum, 
Assignability of Claim for Legal Malpractice, 64 A.L.R.6th 473 (2011) (collecting cases). Public 
policy considerations precluding the assignment of a legal malpractice action focus on the need 
to preserve the sanctity of attorney-client relationships, the personal nature of the attorney-client 
relationship, and the need to maintain the integrity of the judicial process. MNC Credit Corp. v. 
Sickels, 497 S.E.2d 331,334 (Va. 1998); Wagener v. McDonald, 509 N.W.2d 188,191 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1993). 
1. Whether a legal malpractice claim is assignable is a decision to be 
made by this Court. 
St. Luke's suggests, citing Idaho Code Ann. § 55-402, that this Court should defer to the 
Idaho Legislature in determining whether a legal malpractice claim is assignable. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 22-24,29-31). But this Court has the inherent power to regulate the bar and has been 
ever mindful of its role in ensuring the sanctity of and safeguarding the attorney-client 
relationship. Malmin v. Oths, 126 Idaho 1024, 1029,895 P.2d 1217, 1221-22 (1995) ("Since 
territorial days, the regulation of the practice of law in Idaho has been the province of the 
judiciary."); Application of Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297,308,206 P.2d 528,539 (1949) (noting that 
in 1895 this Court invoked its inherent authority to admit the first woman to the Idaho bar in 
direct opposition to legislative enactments then limiting the practice to white males). Other State 
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Supreme Courts have rejected such a "deference to the legislature" argument, given the 
judiciary's role in regulating the practice of law. Can Do, Inc. Pension and Profit Sharing Plan 
and Successor Plans, 922 S.W.2d at 868 (concluding it was appropriate for Tennessee Supreme 
Court to resolve assignment issue because the court has exclusive original jurisdiction over 
matters relating to the practice of law); Delaware CWC Liquidation Corp. v. Martin, 584 S.E.2d 
473,478 (W. Va. 2003) (one of the court's unique functions involves regulating the special 
relationship of attorney and client). 
A statute similar to Idaho Code Ann. § 55-402 existed in California, which the California 
Goodley court addressed in denying the assignment of a legal malpractice claim. 
In 1872, our Legislature effected a change in the common law rule 
of nonassignability of choses in action by enacting sections 953 
and 954, Civil Code. Thus, a thing in action arising out of either 
the violation of a right of property or an obligation or contract may 
be transferred. The construction and application of the broad rule 
of assignability have developed a complex pattern of case law 
underlying which is the basic public policy that "[a]ssignability of 
things in action is now the rule; nonassignability, the exception." 
133 Cal. Rptr. at 84 (internal citations omitted). Despite this statute, the California court 
concluded that its view "that a chose in action for legal malpractice is not assignable is 
predicated on the uniquely personal nature oflegal services and the contract out of which a 
highly personal and confidential attorney-client relationship arises, and public policy 
considerations based thereon." Id. at 86. Luciani respectfully requests that the Court reach the 
same result here. 
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Moreover, for § 55-402 to apply, a legal malpractice cause of action must be "a thing in 
action arising out of the violation of a right of property or out of an obligation." Idaho Code 
Ann. § 55-402. Given this Court's ruling in Bishop, _ P.3d _,2012 WL 90134, that a legal 
malpractice claim abates on one's death, this Court necessarily concluded a legal malpractice 
cause of action is not a "thing in action" under the statute. "Right of property" and "obligation" 
refer to property and contractual rights rather than tort claims. 
st. Luke's cites to the Court of Appeals' discussion in Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, 104 
Idaho 234,657 P.2d 1102 (1983). Bonanza Motors did not involve an assignment of a legal 
malpractice claim. In Bonanza Motors, the Court of Appeals, in addressing what may be 
assigned under § 55-402, states "an attorney-client relationship generally imposes upon a law 
firm a contractual obligation, analogous to that of an agent or trustee, to account for funds 
received in the course oflegal representation." 104 Idaho at 236,657 P.2d at 1104. The Court 
of Appeals held the client's interests in proceeds of a settlement were assignable to a creditor to 
whom the client owed money on a delinquent promissory note. !d. As discussed by this Court in 
Bishop, _ P.3d_, 2012 WL 90134, the attorney-client relationship here is premised on tort 
not contract. And the claim here is not "analogous to that of an agent or trustee, to account for 
funds received in the course of legal representation," which was the limited situation addressed 
by the Court of Appeals in Bonanza Motors. 
Given this Court's role in safeguarding the attorney-client relationship, the issue before 
the Court should not be decided based on Idaho Code Ann. § 55-402. 
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2. Assignment should be rejected based on the unique character of legal 
services. 
This Court has consistently acknowledged the intimate nature ofthe attorney-client 
relationship. See Harrigfeld, 90 P.3d at 886. It is the unique character oflegal services, the 
personal nature of the attorney's duty to the client and the confidentiality of the attorney-client 
relationship which has, as previously stated, led courts across the country to reject assignment. 
Gurski v. Rosenblum and Filan, LLC, 885 A.2d 163, 169 (Conn. 2005) (citing cases so holding); 
Delaware cwe Liquidation Corp., 584 S.E.2d at 477-78 (citing cases and stating "[i]t is beyond 
cavil that this Court recognizes the attorney-client relationship to be of the highest fiduciary 
nature" and "this Court is ever mindful of its role in ensuring that the sanctity ofthis confidential 
relationship is preserved and protected"); Taylor v. Babin, 13 So.3d 633, 639 (La. Ct. App. 2009) 
(finding "the common theme in cases holding that legal malpractice claims are not assignable is 
that the relationship between an attorney and his client is a fiduciary relationship of the very 
highest character, and it binds the attorney to most conscientious fidelity"); Roberts v. Holland & 
Hart, 857 P.2d 492,495 (Colo. App. 1993) ("the assignment oflegal malpractice claims involve 
matters of personal trust and personal service and do not lend themselves to assignability"). 
In Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87, in holding the cause of action for legal malpractice was 
not assignable, the California court stated: 
It is the unique quality of legal services, the personal nature of the 
attorney's duty to the client and the confidentiality of the attorney-
client relationship that invoke public policy considerations in our 
conclusion that malpractice claims should not be subject to 
assignment. 
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The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in also refusing to permit assignment of a legal malpractice 
claim in Coffey v. Jefferson County Bd. oJEduc., 756 S.W.2d 155,157 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988), 
relied on the decision in Goodley, quoting: 
Our view that a chose in action for legal malpractice is not 
assignable is predicated on the uniquely personal nature of legal 
services and the contract out of which a highly personal and 
confidential attorney-client relationship arises. 
See also Assoc. Ins. Service, Inc. v. Garcia, 307 S.W.3d 58,63 (Ky. 2010), as modified, reh'g 
denied (recognizing "exception to the general rule that a claim may be assigned has been created 
for legal malpractice claims"); Earth Science Labs., Inc. v. Adkins & Wondra, P.e., 523 N.W.2d 
254,257 (Neb. 1994) (refusing to permit assignment because of "personal nature and 
confidentiality involved in attorney-client relationship"); Delaware CWC Liquidation Corp., 584 
S.E.2d at 477 ("[t]o permit the assignment of a claim that is firmly rooted in the highly personal 
attorney-client relationship would denigrate both the legal profession and the justice system"); 
Chaffee v. Smith, 645 P .2d 966 (Nev. 1982) (public policy prevents transfer of malpractice claim 
because right is personal to client). 
There is an incompatibility between the voluntary assignment of a legal malpractice 
claim and an attorney's duty ofloyalty and duty to maintain client confidentiality. Can Do, Inc. 
Pension and Profit Sharing Plan and Successor Plans, 922 S.W.2d at 869. An attorney owes a 
fiduciary and ethical duty to his or her client. Based on this Court's historical view that the 
relationship between attorney and client is a highly personal and fiduciary relationship, this 
Court should, like the majority of courts, preclude an assignment of a legal malpractice claim. 
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3. Assignments undermine the attorney-client relationship. 
Moreover, assignments undermine the attorney-client relationship in two essential ways. 
Assignments would eliminate the attorney's duty of confidentiality by creating circumstances 
where the client's control over the attorney's disclosure of confidential information would be 
lost; at minimum, the possibility of an assignment would inhibit transfer of information between 
the attorney and the client. Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87; Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 
338,343-44 (Ind. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 
2007) (affirming lower court's grant of summary judgment on legal malpractice claim on 
grounds that assignment of claim to former adversary was contrary to public policy); Wagener, 
509 N.W.2d at 192. 
When a client sues an attorney for malpractice, the attorney may utilize confidential 
information revealed by the client to defend against the claim. Idaho Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.6(b )(5). Because the client may stop the malpractice litigation at any point, the client 
controls the confidential information release. Rosby Corp. v. Townsend, Yosha, Cline & Price, 
800 N.E.2d 661, 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); see Picadilly, 582 N.E.2d at 343. When a client 
assigns a claim for legal malpractice, however, the client has no further rights in the action. See 
Purco Elect. Service, 90 P.3d at 351 (assignor is divested of all control and right to the cause of 
action). The client has no right to force the withdrawal of the assignee's legal malpractice suit to 
prevent disclosure of confidential information. !d. The potential for assignment may cause a 
client to restrict an attorney's access to valuable information in a preemptive effort to prevent 
future disclosure should an assignment become advantageous. Picadilly, 582 N.E.2d at 343. 
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The weakening of the confidential duty holds true regardless of the client's level of 
sophistication. Id. at 343. "Far-sighted clients would be encouraged to withhold damaging 
information from their attorney in order to preserve their ability to sell off a malpractice claim 
without the fear oflosing control over the information." !d. Clients who do not anticipate this 
possibility of future disclosure may be blind-sided by the disclosure of confidential information 
in the event the assigned legal malpractice claim goes forward. Id. 
Assignments jeopardize the attorney's duty of loyalty by creating conflicts of interest 
between the attorney and the client. Id. at 342; Taylor, 13 So.3d at 641 ("the mere threat of a 
malpractice claim being assigned would be detrimental to an attorney's duty of loyalty and 
confidentiality"); Roberts, 857 P.2d at 495 ("We are also concerned that an attorney's duty of 
loyalty to his client could be compromised by anticipating an assignment of possible legal 
malpractice claims."). 
The classic occurrence arises in settlement negotiations. An adversary unable to collect a 
judgment may agree to a settlement in exchange for assignment of any legal malpractice claims 
the opposing party may have against his attorney. The adversary then seeks to obtain a judgment 
against the attorney. Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1966). The attorney is faced with a dilemma. The attorney's duty ofloyalty runs only to the 
client. However, in accepting the favorable offer to the client, the attorney makes himself a 
target for future litigation. The client's interest in accepting a favorable settlement offer, 
extinguishing his liability, is contrary to the attorney's interest in avoiding a lawsuit. !d. 
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In essence, assignments could become a "bargaining chip in the negotiation of 
settlements - particularly for clients without a deep pocket," as "[a]n adversary might well make 
a favorable settlement offer to a judgment-proof or financially strapped client in exchange for the 
assignment of that client's right to bring a malpractice claim against [the] attorney." State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estep, 873 N.E.2d 1021, 1026 n.9 (Ind. 2007), quotingPicadilly, 582 
N.E.2d at 342-43. These concerns can directly or subjectively influence an attorney's loyalty, 
dedication and zeal in pursuing his client's claims. Zuniga, 878 S.W.2d at 317. 
4. Assignments increase litigation. 
Beyond the personal nature of the suit and the breaches of duty and confidentiality, the 
assignment oflegal malpractice claims, if permitted, increases litigation. Goodley, 133 Cal. 
Rptr. at 87. 
Here, Twin Falls County's exposure in the Suter litigation was a factor in the price 
received from St. Luke's for Twin Falls County assets. St. Luke's bought into the exposure and 
negotiated for its cost. Twin Falls County was able to sell the Suter Litigation risk to St. Luke's. 
Twin Falls was not damaged. Nevertheless St. Luke's has pursued this lawsuit against Luciani. 
Other courts have agreed with the concerns raised in Goodley, expressing a concern that 
the assignment of legal malpractice claims will lead to a number of frivolous claims that seek to 
tap the "deep pockets" of the attorneys and their malpractice insurers. In Moorhouse v. 
Ambassador Ins. Co., 383 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985), the Michigan court upheld its 
prior decision precluding the assignment of a legal malpractice claim. Speaking of its earlier 
decision, the Moorhouse court explained: 
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Id. at 221. 
[T]he Court carefully analyzed the policy consideration attendant 
to the issue of whether a legal malpractice action ought to be 
assignable. The Court concluded that a legal malpractice action is 
not assignable because of the personal nature of the attorney-client 
relationship and because assignment of such claims would relegate 
the legal malpractice action to the marketplace, which would 
encourage unjustified suits, increase legal malpractice litigation, 
and force attorneys to defend themselves against strangers .... We 
decline to hold [that our earlier decision] was wrongly decided. 
Assignments create a marketplace for legal malpractice claims that is inherently 
detrimental to the legal profession. Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87; Delaware CWC Liquidation 
Corp., 584 S.E.2d at 479 (citing cases so concluding). In Zuniga, 878 S.W.2d at 316, the Texas 
court echoed a common theme: "We do not relish the thought of entrepreneurs purchasing the 
legal rights of clients against their attorneys as an ordinary business transaction in pursuit of 
profit." The leading case prohibiting assignments oflegal malpractice claims, Goodley, voiced 
similar concerns, stating "[t]he commercial aspect of assignability of choses in action arising out 
oflegal malpractice is rife with probabilities that could only debase the legal profession." Id. at 
133 Cal. Rptr. at 87. 
Characterizing the assignment as a commercial transaction, as St. Luke's does, does not 
eliminate this public policy concern. For example, in InLiner Americas, Inc. v. Macomb 
Funding Group, LLC, 348 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010), the Texas Court of Appeals rejected 
the contemplated transfer of a legal malpractice claim accomplished in the context of transfer of 
assets in a commercial setting. The Texas Court of Appeals concluded that the contemplated suit 
would demean the profession by creating a marketplace for the sale and resale of malpractice 
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claims. Allowing such transfers could foment lawsuits against attorneys by encouraging 
creditors to look at potential malpractice claims as an alternative way of capturing funds. Id. 
at 8. 
5. Assignments impact negatively on the public's perception of the legal 
profession. 
Assignments can require attorneys to advocate patently contradictory positions in 
successive proceedings. This reinforces negative public perception of the legal profession. In 
Aleman Services Corp. v. Bullock, 925 F. Supp. 252, 255 (D.N.J. 1996), afJ'd 124 F.3d 185 (3rd 
Cir. 1997), a judgment-proof defendant suffered a $7 million default judgment to the plaintiff. 
The defendant then assigned any potential legal malpractice claim against his attorney to the 
plaintiff and the plaintiff assignee sued the attorney for legal malpractice. The litigants' position 
and the Court's negative reaction is illustrated in the following passage: 
In obtaining its $7 million default judgment ... [plaintiff] filed an 
affidavit swearing that [defendant] rightfully owed [plaintiff] the 
full $7 million. [Plaintiff-assignee] now seeks to come before this 
court and argue, in essence, that [defendant] did not actually owe 
the full $7 million, but, rather, that some portion of that $7 million 
was the result of[the attorney's] malpractice. 
925 F. SUpp. at 256. The Zuniga court stated that "[f]or the law to countenance this abrupt and 
shameless shift of positions would give prominence (and substance) to the image that lawyers 
will take any position depending upon where the money lies, and that litigation is a mere game 
and not a search for the truth." 878 S.W.2d at 318. 
Iflegal malpractice claims are assignable, "lawyers [might] be reluctant to take difficult 
cases because of the risk that they [would] be viewed as a source of collecting the defendants' 
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costs on the plaintiffs' judgment." Ronald E. Mallen, Duty to Nonclients: Exploring the 
Boundaries, 37 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1147, 1165 (1996). Courts prohibiting assignment agree that the 
restriction oflegal services to all but clients with sufficient assets is contrary to public policy. 
Zuniga, 878 S.W.2d at 318. 
The court in Goodley, l33 Cal. Rptr. at 87, stated that assignments "would most surely 
result in a selective process for carefully choosing clients thereby rendering a disservice to the 
public and the profession." This concern was reiterated in Alcman Services Corp., 925 F. Supp. 
at 258-59 (allowing assignments "would make insolvent, underinsured,judgment-proof 
defendants extremely unattractive clients, thereby making it harder for them to obtain legal 
representation"). 
The Court cannot ignore the very real possibility that clients will begin colluding with 
other parties. A client may intentionally sacrifice his attorney-client relationship in order to 
settle the original claim without his attorney even knowing their relationship has been 
compromised. Can Do, Inc. Pension and Profit Sharing Plan and Successor Plans, 922 S.W.2d 
at 869 ("[a]ssignment would undermine the fundamental structure and function of the 
relationship and create a risk of collusion that must not be countenanced"); see Alcman Services 
Corp., 925 F. Supp. at 258; Coffey, 756 S.W.2d at 157; Wagener v. McDonald, 509 N.W.2d at 
191. In Coffey v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 756 S.W.2d at 156, for example, the defendant 
appeared in court with the plaintiff, confessed to a $1 million judgment, and immediately 
attempted to assign his legal malpractice claim against his attorney to the plaintiff. The court 
refused to allow the assignment because of the appearance of collusion. !d. 
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F. The Fact That St. Luke's Chose to Assume the Suter Litigation by Contract 
Does Not Eliminate the Public Policy Reasons for Precluding the Assignment 
of Legal Malpractice Claims. 
St. Luke's asks this Court to ignore all the public policy reasons that have been 
enunciated by courts across the country and hold this legal malpractice claim is assignable 
because it is a "successor" to a predecessor business. (Order, pp. 2-3). The characterization of 
"successor" is commonly used when a party seeks to hold an existing entity liable for certain 
obligations of an entity that no longer exists or is otherwise unable to pay the claim. Cases 
commonly involve a successor's alleged exposure for a predecessor's products claim, 
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environmental claims, and collective bargaining obligations. See, e.g., Turner v. Bituminous 
Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 883-84 (Mich. 1976); U.S. v. Gen. Battery Corp. Inc., 423 F.3d 294, 
300-01 (3rd Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom Exide Tech v. U.s., 549 U.S. 941 (2006); John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,549-51 (1964). That label of "successor" does 
not apply here. 
The Hospital was owned by Twin Falls County at the time of Luciani's representation. 
Twin Falls County still exists. This was not a merger transaction in which, by operation oflaw, 
the surviving corporation succeeds to all the attributes ofthe predecessor "disappearing" 
corporation. There is no reason why a wholly independent purchasing entity, at arms' length to 
the seller, should inherit the attributes of the seller's attorney-client relationship merely because 
the transaction included sufficient assets ofthe seller to enable the purchaser to continue some 
discrete portion of the seller's business. But that is St. Luke's "successor" argument and Luciani 
respectfully requests the Court reject that argument. 
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1. Other courts have acknowledged the same public policy considera-
tions apply to preclude a legal malpractice assignment based on a 
company's purchase of another's assets. 
Courts have rejected the notion that public policy considerations change because, under 
the facts of the case, the party seeking to assert a legal malpractice claim based on an assignment 
purchased another company's assets. In Earth Science Labs., Inc., 523 N.W.2d at 257, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court explained: 
Id. at 257. 
In this case, the defendant [attorneys] owed no duty to the plaintiff 
[purchasing corporation], who was not a client, and the plaintiff 
[purchasing corporation] did not acquire that duty through its 
purchase of the assets of [ the seller] because of the personal nature 
and confidentiality involved in the attorney-client relationship. 
In Virginia, in its case establishing the rule of nonassignability, the legal malpractice 
claims in issue had been assigned to the plaintiff corporation by a sister subsidiary corporation 
pursuant to an asset purchase agreement. MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickels, 497 S.E.2d 331, 332 n.1 
(Va. 1998). The sister corporation, not the plaintiff, had once been the client of the defendant 
law firm. Id. at 332. The Virginia Supreme Court quoted extensively from the seminal case of 
Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87, which explained that permitting assignments oflegal malpractice 
claims would lead to the undesirable "merchandizing" of such claims, and thus "encourage 
unjustified lawsuits against members ofthe legal profession, generate an increase in legal 
malpractice litigation, promote champerty and force attorneys to defend themselves against 
strangers." !d. at 333-34. 
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The Virginia Supreme Court held that the rule which prohibits the assignment oflegal 
malpractice claims "safeguards the attorney-client relationship, which is an indispensable 
component of our adversarial system of justice." Id. at 334. The Virginia Supreme Court 
adopted a bright line rule against the assignment of legal malpractice claims. Luciani requests 
this Court do the same. See Rosby Corp. v. Townsend, Yosha, Cline & Price, 800 N.E.2d 661, 
664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing a bright line drawn that no legal malpractice claims may 
be assigned, regardless of whether they are assigned to an adversary). 
In New Falls Corp. v. Lerner, 352 Fed. Appx. 596, 597-98 (2nd Cir. 2009), a client-
corporation attempted to transfer all of its rights, title, interest and assets in the corporation to the 
successor corporation, including its interest in an underlying cause of action, through a loan 
purchase agreement. The successor corporation then brought a cause of action for legal 
malpractice against the predecessor's attorney for allegedly failing to perfect an attachment 
against real property which formed the basis of the underlying lawsuit. !d. at 597. The 
agreement provided that it was to be construed pursuant to California law. Id. 
Noting California's well-established prohibition on the assignability oflegal malpractice 
claims, the Federal District Court concluded that the assignment of rights in the loan enforce-
ment action could not have included an assignment of a potential legal malpractice claim. New 
Falls Corp. v. Lerner, 579 F. Supp. 2d 282, 288-89 (D. Conn. 2008). On appeal, the appellate 
court affirmed the district court's dismissal ofthe legal malpractice claim. New Falls Corp., 352 
Fed. Appx. at 597. The Court of Appeals agreed that the assignment of potential legal 
malpractice claims was void, citing California's emphatic public policy prohibiting such an 
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assignment, stating that the assignee-corporation "was attempting to enforce a right that it did not 
have" and held that the transaction was barred at the outset so a transfer of the legal malpractice 
claim never occurred. Id. at 598. 
Rejecting the minority of jurisdictions that have allowed the voluntary assignment of 
legal malpractice claims on a case-by-case basis, and specifically mentioning the cases cited by 
S1. Luke's to this Court, the West Virginia Supreme Court in Delaware CWC Liquidation Corp., 
584 S.E.2d at 479, likewise concluded: 
We are not persuaded by the reasoning of the small number of 
courts which have allowed the assignment of legal malpractice 
claims. It is of particular concern to this Court that the relationship 
between an attorney and his client remain a confidential, fiduciary 
relationship of the very highest character. '" To permit the 
assignment of a claim that is firmly rooted in the highly personal 
attorney-client relationship would denigrate both the legal pro-
fession and the justice system. We will not allow this most certain 
consequence. Accordingly, we hold that the assignment of a legal 
malpractice claim is contrary to the public policy of West Virginia. 
Therefore, any such assignment is void as a matter oflaw. 
Id. at 479; see also Law Office of David J. Stein v. Security Nat 'I Servicing Corp., 969 So.2d 962, 
968-69 (Fla. 2007), reh 'g denied (rejecting minority case-by-case approach). 
3. This Court should reject the minority view asserted by St. Luke's. 
S1. Luke's primarily relies on Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, 728 A.2d 
1057, 1059-60 (R.I. 1999), Richter v. Analex Corp., 940 F. Supp. 353, 358 (D.D.C. 1996), and 
Hedlund Mfg. Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 539 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1988), in support of its 
position that this Court should permit the assignment of a legal malpractice claim here. 
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Cerberus is a Rhode Island case holding that "the assignment of legal malpractice claims 
as an integral part of a larger commercial transaction" is permissible. 728 A.2d at 1059-60. In 
so holding, the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated: "On the specific factual circumstances 
present in this case, where an assignee of a commercial loan agreement brings a legal 
malpractice action against the attorney who represented the original lender in the commercial 
loan transaction, the assignment of that negligence claim, if arising from the assigned 
commercial loan agreement, is not prohibited by Rhode Island law." !d. The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court relied in part on its earlier decision holding the Rhode Island Depositors 
Economic Protection Corp. acquired the attorney-client privilege along with other assets that 
formerl y belonged to the financial institutions it took over in the banking crisis. !d, at 1061. The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded "[p ]resumably, ifthe attorney-client privilege was 
transferred ... so too was any right to bring an action for legal malpractice." Id. The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court therefore concluded in Cerberus such an assignment was consistent with 
previously enunciated Rhode Island law. !d. 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court ultimately does not offer a convincing rationale for 
vesting an arm's length purchase with the incidents of the seller's attorney-client relationship. 
With regard to assignment, the Rhode Island Supreme Court concludes an assignment of a bare 
legal claim for malpractice is somehow different from the assignment of a malpractice claim that 
is "part of a general assignment in a commercial setting." Id. at 1060. As stated previously, 
other jurisdictions have rejected such a distinction. Delaware CWC Liquidation Corp., 584 
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S.E.2d at 479. And unlike Rhode Island, this Court's previous enunciations do not support such 
an assignment. 
In Richter, the Federal District Court acknowledged the majority of courts have 
concluded that assignment of legal malpractice claims is not permissible, but distinguished the 
case before it, in part, because the liabilities that were assumed arose directly out of the 
attorney's conduct. 940 F. Supp. at 358. It should be noted in denying the motion to dismiss, the 
court left to further factual development whether the terms ofthe purchase agreement between 
the old and new corporation should be construed as assigning the claim against the attorney to 
the new corporation. !d. 
Here, the Agreement contained no explicit or implicit reference to the assignment of a 
legal malpractice claim. Although St. Luke's was aware ofthe Suter Litigation and the alleged 
"emergency" created by Luciani's failure to identify a rebuttal expert to the Nicholson report, the 
assignment of a legal malpractice claim was not identified in the Agreement. The purported 
assignment of a legal malpractice claim was not consummated in a separate assignment 
agreement during the asset purchase transaction, although Twin Falls County and St. Luke's 
executed other assignment agreements. "In order to determine the intent ofthe assignment, the 
court looks to the contract between the assignor and assignee." Purco Fleet Service, Inc., 90 
P.3d at 351. An effective assignment must describe the subject matter of the assignment with 
sufficient particularity to render it capable of identification. The parties' failure to reference 
legal malpractice claims in the Agreement, and to execute transactional documents as with other 
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assigned rights and liabilities, renders the alleged assignment insufficiently specific to be given 
any effect. 
Moreover, looking at the terms of the Agreement as a whole, such an assignment is 
contrary to its terms. There is a provision in the Agreement with Twin Falls County to change 
the price of the deal if the Suter Litigation was not reasonably valued in that Agreement. 
(Tompkins Dec. Ex. 7 at Art. XV). Because Twin Falls County was able to sell this risk to 
St. Luke's, Twin Falls County sustained no damage due to any purported negligence by Luciani 
unless it could show it would have derived a better purchase price from St. Luke's than it 
received. That claim has not been made by Twin Falls County. 
The Agreement also means that the amount paid with regard to the Suter Litigation was 
paid by Twin Falls County, not St. Luke's, because the price was paid in the Agreement in the 
form of reduced consideration. The fact that St. Luke's has not exercised its right under the 
Agreement to adjust the purchase price with Twin Falls County means the ultimate cost was 
within the range accounted for in the transaction. 
St. Luke's also relies inappropriately on Hedlund Mfg. Co., 539 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1987), to 
argue that it is entitled to bring a legal malpractice claim against Luciani. In Hedlund, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the concept of the attorney-client relationship 
should not be used as a shield by an attorney to protect him or her from the consequences of 
legal malpractice. Id. at 359. However, this rationale was debunked in Wagener, 509 N.W.2d at 
192, where the Minnesota Court of Appeals explained that the "shield theory" is not relevant 
because the actual client would not be precluded from filing a legal malpractice claim; the only 
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claim being precluded was the assignment or marketing of a legal malpractice claim. Taylor, 13 
So.3d at 641 (also rejecting shield argument). 
Likewise, St. Luke's "shield" argument should be rejected here. Contrary to St. Luke's 
assertion, Luciani's client Twin Falls County survives and it, ifit were damaged, would have 
been the proper party to assert a claim against Luciani. Tate v. Goins, Underkofler, Crawford & 
Langdon, 24 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (invalidity of assignment does not preclude client 
from bringing legal malpractice claim against former attorney). 
Luciani respectfully requests this Court reject the minority view espoused by St. Luke's 
and hold such assignment is contrary to Idaho law. 
G. An Asset Purchase Does Not Transfer an Attorney-Client Relationship and 
Twin Falls County Had Nothing to Assign. 
Finally, it cannot be ignored that Twin Falls County had no legal malpractice action to 
assign. An assignee can take no more than the assignor has to assign. Cobb Bank & Trust Co. v. 
American Manufacturers Mut. Ins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 328, 334 (N.D. Ga. 1978), afJ'd 624 F.2d 
722 (5th Cir. 1980). A legal assignment relates to a thing in being. An equitable assignment 
relates to contingent interests and expectancies. 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments § 5 (2012); Keeley v. 
Indemnity Co. of America, 7 S.W.2d 434,437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928), reh 'g denied (assignment of 
thing not in existence gives only equitable right). This Court has not recognized equitable 
assignments. Sirius LC v. Erickson, 150 Idaho 80, 86, 244 P .3d 224, 230 (Idaho 2010), reh 'g 
denied; Casady v. Scott, 40 Idaho 137,237 P. 415, 421 (Idaho 1924), reh 'g denied ("A legal 
39 
assignment of mere naked possibilities or expectancies, not coupled with an interest, has never 
been recognized ... "). Here, there was nothing to assign. 
Fundamentally, the purchase of assets did not transfer an attorney-client relationship. See 
SMI Indus. Canada, Ltd. v. Caelter Indus., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 808,815-16 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(plaintiffs argument [that by virtue of being an assignee of the defendant's parent corporation it 
succeeds to the rights ofthe law firm's former client] is "without merit and unsupported by the 
case law"); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. McAtee, 124 F.R.D. 662, 664 (D. Kan. 1988); In re 
Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1976). And a corporation that 
acquires the assets of another is generally not liable for the torts of its predecessor. Travis v. 
Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443,446 (7th Cir. 1977). St. Luke's exposure to the Suter Plaintiffs' 
litigation occurred because it chose to assume that liability as currency for the purchase and lease 
of assets, instead of leaving that liability with Twin Falls County and paying more cash for 
assets. Id. (recognizing exception to general rule where there is an express agreement of 
assumption). 
St. Luke's could only acquire a legal malpractice claim that had accrued to Twin Falls 
County and against Luciani before the closing of the Asset Purchase Agreement. St. Luke's did 
not have an attorney-client relationship with Luciani. Luciani's relationship only existed with 
Twin Falls County. St. Luke's can only pursue, if anything, those damages sustained by Twin 
Falls County. 
Twin Falls County's dissatisfaction with Luciani's services would not, by itself, create a 
cause of action. Negligence alone does not warrant a recovery for a client in a legal malpractice 
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case, as there must also be damage proximately resulting from an attorney's malpractice. A 
cause of action cannot arise for legal malpractice until damages are incurred. City of McCall v. 
Buxton, 146 Idaho 656,661,201 P.3d 629,634 (2009). 
As the facts of this case make clear, at the time Luciani was discharged as counsel the 
underlying Suter Litigation was in process and about four years from resolution under the 
management of substitute counsel. No harm from any aspect of the defense of the case had 
accrued to Twin Falls County. Indeed, Twin Falls County was successful in transferring the risk 
in the sale ofthe Hospital assets and had not incurred any damages. Thus, there was nothing to 
assign to St. Luke's because there was no cause of action and Twin Falls County could not grant 
that which it did not have. 
St. Luke's even goes so far as to assert it can claim punitive damages against Luciani. 
Punitive damages are "damages awarded to a claimant, over and above what will compensate the 
claimant for actual personal injury and property damage, to serve the public policies of punishing 
a defendant for outrageous conduct and of deterring future like conduct." Idaho Code Ann. 
§ 6-1601(9); Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital, Inc., 122 Idaho 47, 52,830 P.2d 1185, 
1190 (Idaho 1992), reh 'g denied. Assuming Twin Falls County possessed such a claim, it 
certainly is not assignable. See Summit Account & Computer Service, Inc. v. RJH of Florida, 
Inc., 690 N.E.2d 723, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), reh 'g denied (recognizing neither punitive 
damages nor legal malpractice claims are assignable). The Nevada Supreme Court in Chaffee, 
645 P.2d at 966, refused, as a matter of public policy, to permit enforcement of a legal 
malpractice action by transfer which was never pursued by the client. 
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Neither present law nor public policy supports St. Luke's action against Luciani. Luciani 
respectfully requests this Court hold St. Luke's cannot proceed against Luciani. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent/Defendant Luciani and his law firm respectfully request this Court answer 
the certified question in the negative. No legal malpractice claim against Luciani was assignable. 
Dated: February 14,2012 TROUT. JONES. GLEDHILL. FUHRMAN. GOURLEY, P.A. 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents Thomas R. 
Luciani and Stamper, Rubens, Stocker & Smith, P.A. 
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